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The purpose of the present bankruptcy act is to discharge the
bankrupt from existing obligations and distribute his assets ratably
among his creditors.' 8 By construing subdivision (4) as independent of subdivision (1) the logic of the principal case would allow
proof of practically all contingent claims founded upon contract.
This construction seems to be in furtherance of the purpose of the
act, in that it allows these contingent claims to be proved and discharged. A meritorious limitation upon this broad rule is found in
the English bankruptcy act to the effect that the amount of the
damages be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. 19

F. D. HAMRICK,

JR.

Conflict of Laws-Validity of Foreign ContractsEffect of Domestic Usury Laws.
The receiver for a bankrupt North Carolina corporation sued the
defendant, a credit company, incorporated in Delaware with principal office in Baltimore, for tvice the amount of usurious interest
allegedly paid by the lumber company.' By a "covering agreement"
the lumber company "sold" and the credit company "bought" acceptable accounts, notes, drafts, and other paper taken from the
former's customers and mailed to defendant in Baltimore. Defendant advanced 77 per cent on acceptance and the balance when the
customer paid the lumber company as defendant's agent and the latter
remitted. If the customer did not pay, defendant served notice and
charged the amount back. For this and other services not deemed
material by the court, the credit company collected 1/30 of 1 per
cent of the net face value of accounts for each day, and other charges
amounting to 15 per cent. The contract stipulated that the law of
Delaware should govern, also that it was not to be effective until
accepted by defendant in Baltimore. (Corporations cannot take adCentral Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., supra note 15 at 591;
Williams v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554, 35 Sup. Ct. 289, 59 L. ed.
713 (1915).
"(1883) 46 & 47 VicT. c. 52, para. 37 (1) (3), 1 CHIT. STAT. 702; ef. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084 (1903) (the con-

tract of a husband to pay his wife an annuity so long as she should remain a
widow held not a provable claim in bankruptcy because the value of the annuity
was so uncertain as to be incapable of estimation).
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §2306, provides that all interest is forfeited for charging usury, and twice the interest may be recovered for usurious
interest paid.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
2
vantage of the usury statute in Delaware or Maryland. ) Held:
This was a loan. The contract was made in Maryland. If made in
good faith without intent to evade the North Carolina usury law,
Maryland law applies, otherwise North Carolina law. The issue of
good faith should have been submitted to the jury, hence reversed
and remanded.3
The first question is was this a loan or a sale? The court looks
through form to substance. 4 This is always the rule. Thus in one
case the language is found: "Where a transaction is in reality a loan
of money (it will be so treated), whatever may be its form," and
"by whatever name the charge may be called." The identical contract involved in the instant case has been construed by one District
6
Court to be a loan, 5 and by another District Court to be a sale.
Our court is "of the opinion that the agreement contemplates a loan."
This seems the sound, analytical view, for the credit company took
no risk, charging all unpaid accounts back to the lumber company.
The authorities are in great confusion as to what law governs the
validity of a contract, and the same court will often enunciate inconsistent theories. The courts have laid down three general rules:
(1) the law of the place of making; (2) the law of the place of performance; (3) the law intended by the parties. The latter is the
English rule, probably the majority rule in this country, and is mod7
ified by presumptions and limitations.
Early North Carolina cases went on the intention rule. If there
was no place of payment or performance different from the place of
making, the court presumed the parties intended the law of the latter
8
Where
place to govern, or they would have stipulated otherwise.

IMD.ANN. CODE (Baghy, 1924), art. 49, §5. No corporation can plead

usury as a defense, nor maintain an action based upon usury.
DELAWARE, GENERAL CoRPoRAroN ACT, §4, provides that corporations cre-

ated to deal in notes, accounts, etc., shall not be construed as engaging in the
business of banking, and may charge such amounts as the respective parties
agree upon.
I Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. C. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931).
'Burwell v. Burgwyn, 100 N. C. 639, 6 S. E. 409 (1888) ; Bank v. Wysong,
177 N. C. 380, 99 S. E. 199 (1918) ; Lumber Co. v. Trust Co., 179 N. C. 211,
S. E. 205 (1919) ; Ripple v. Mortgage Co., 193 N. C. 422, 137 S. E. 156
102
(1927).
1Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. (2d) 724-30 (E.D. Pa.1929).
'Inre Eby,39 F. (2d) 76 (E. D. N. C. 1929).
1 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 228.
SArrington v. Gee, 27 N. C. 590 (1845) ; Houston v.Potts, 64 N. C. 33
(1870); Williams v. Carr, 80 N. C. 294 (1879); Hilliard & Co. v. Outlaw, 92
N. C. 266 (1885); Morris v. Hockaday, 94 N. C. 286 (1886); Wood v.
Wheeler, 111 N. C. 231, 16 S.E. 418 (1892); Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C.
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the places differed, some cases presumed that the parties intended the
law of the place of performance to govern,9 others the law of the
place of making.' 0 But not if money was loaned at usury in another
state secured by a mortgage on land in North Carolina, 1 or if there
was evidence of intent to evade the North Carolina usury law,' 2 or
if the capacity of the contracting party, as a married woman, were
in question, the law of the forum-likewise the domicile-being
applied. 13 Unusually strong authority for the intention theory is
found in a decision of the elder Judge Connor written in 1907:
"That, in the absence of such a statute, the parties may agree upon
4
the place of the contract, is well settled."'
The latter cases practically all apply the law of the place of making. 15 This is the rule urged by the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws.'6 But the instant case talks about the presumption that the
parties intended, or must have intended, this law to govern. 17
619, 30 S. E. 315 (1898); Exchange Bank v. Appalachian Land and Lumber

Co., 128 N. C. 193, 38 S. E. 813 (1901) ; Cannady v. Railroad, 143 N. C. 439,
55 S. E. 836 (1906).
'Roberts v. McNeely, 52 N. C. 506 (1860).
" Bryan v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 133 N. C. 604, 45 S.E. 938
(1903) ; Hancock v. Telegraph Co., 137 N. C. 498, 49 S.E. 952 (1905) ; Hall
v. Telegraph Co., 139 N. C. 369, 52 S.E. 50 (1905); Johnson v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 144 N. C. 410, 57 S. E. 122 (1907). (All four of the
preceding cases were suits on the contract against telegraph companies for negligent transmission or delivery of messages.) Bank of Charlotte v. Simpson,
90 N. C. 467 (1884) ; Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N. C. 377, 13 S.E. 138 (1891).
"Commissioners of Craven v. Atlantic & N. C. Railroad Co., 77 N. C. 289
(1877); Rowland v. Old Dominion Building and Loan Association, 115 N. C.
825, 18 S.E. 965 (1894) ; Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association,
116 N. C. 882, 21 S.E. 924 (1895) ; Faison v. Grandy, 128 N. C. 438, 38 S.E.
,397 (1901).
"Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association, 112 N. C. 842, 17 S.E.
637 (1893)
; see Roberts v. McNeely, 52 N. C. 506 at 508 (1860).
" 2Armstrong, Cator & Co. v. Best, 112 N. C. 59, 17 S.E. 14 (1893) ; Hanover National Bank v. Howell, 118 N. C. 271, 23 S.E. 1005 (1896).
'Williams v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 145 N. C. 128, 58
S. E. 802 (1907).
' National Exchange Bank of Baltimore v. Rook Granite Co., 155 N. C.
-43, 70 S.E. 1002 (1911) ; Pfeifer & Co. v. Israel, 161 N. C. 409, 77 S.E. 421
(1913) ; Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes, 167 N. C. 551, 83 S.E.577 (1914) ;
Wilson v. Order of Heptasophs, 174 N. C. 628, 94 S.E. 443 (1917) ; Kesler v.
Iutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 177 N. C. 394, 99 S.E. 207 (1919).
D~raft No. 2, §§333, 353.
" CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1931), Proposed Final
' Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., Jupra note 3. "It is a generally accepted
principle that 'the test of the place of a contract is as to the place at which the
last act was done by either of the parties essential to a meeting of the minds.'
It is clear the contract was executed in Baltimore, because the last act essential
ito completion of the agreement was performed there. Nothing else appearing,
it follows that the parties intended the laws of Maryland to govern its validity
and performance."

NOTES AND COMMENTS
And there are exceptions: where the contract is contrary to a
state statute ;18 contrary to good morals ;19 injurious to the forum or
its citizens;20 violative of the fixed public policy of the state;21
where the loan or place of payment is in another state, but is secured
by a loan upon real estate here, even though the contract stipulated
23
the law of another state should govern ;22 and others.
In the usury cases there is still a strong tendency to adopt the
intention test, presuming the intention of the parties to be to adopt
the law which will make their contract valid.24 It is required, however, that there be no bad faith and no intent to evade the usury
law.2 5 This issue of good faith, which the court says should have
gone to the jury in the instant case, often becomes very difficult to
decide. It is especially so when the court reverses a former position26 and says that the charging of more than 6 per cent interest
under a contract made in another state is not necessarily contrary to
public policy. One commentator observes that this is attaching a
2
penalty to knowledge of the law. 7
The issue of the principal case becomes impressively important
in this era of industrialization of North Carolina. Briefly, do we
need and do we want 15 per cent loans, and can our industry prosper
on 15 per cent loans? Or is this better than no capital available at a
theoretical rate of 6 per cent? The court seems to have been very
28
cognizant of the issues at times.
MARION R.

ALEXANDER.

v. Witcover, 158 N. C. 384, 74 S. E. 11 (1912); Bluthenthal &
'Burrus
Beckhart, Inc. v. Kennedy, 165 N. C. 372, 81 S. E. 337 (1914) ; Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant, 165 N. C. 453, 81 S.E. 606 (1914).
See Burrus v. Witcover, .upra note 18, at 385.
:'See Burrus v. Witcover, spra note 18, at 385.
=Bluthenthal & Beckhart, Inc. v. Kennedy, supra note 18; Williamson v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 151 N. C. 223, 65 S. E. 974 (1909) [Stipulation on telegraph message limiting liability of telegraph company for transmitting unrepeated message. The federal rule applies now and this is changedHardie v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 190 N. C. 45, 128 S.E. 500 (1925)1.
See Burrus v. Witcover, supra note 18, at 385.
' Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association, supra note 11.
See special exception in usury cases, infra note 25, supra note 4.
"' Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., supra note 3.
"Arrington v. Gee, supra note 8; Roberts v. McNeely, supra note 9; Houston v. Potts, supra note 8; Morris v. Hockaday, supra.note 8; Ripple v. Mortgage Corporation, supra note 4; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., supra note

3.

, tRipple v. Mortgage Corporation, supra note 4.
' Note (1921) 21 CoL L. REv. 585.
n Burwell, J., in Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association, supra
note 11, at 889: "Comity does not require that we allow foreign corporations

